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  There are diverse ideas about governance around the world, and this paper studies 
them through the following questions: (a) what does the available evidence tell us about the 
political and institutional requirements for sustained economic growth? (b) What do we need 
from the state to secure growth? (c) How do a country’s internal characteristics support or 
impede  its  growth?  (d)  How  does  the  external  environment  of  a  country  influence  its 
economic growth prospects?  These elements are then put together into a model of growth, 
from which we derive conclusions about governance arrangements. Thus the paper outlines 
a simple framework within which to think about the political economy of growth that can be 
summed  up  in  five  points:  good  government,  with  secure  political  conditions;  credible 
macroeconomic stability; savings and investment high enough to sustain adequate growth; 
openness to the world economy; and the discipline of external engagement.  It then argues 
that the growth model needs to be underpinned by suitable governance arrangements, and 
suggests  that  good governance  has  two  main  elements,  each  quite  complex  in  practice, 
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“I would suggest that the rate at which countries grow is substantially 
determined  by  three  things:  their  ability  to  integrate  with  the  global 
economy  through  trade  and  investment;  their  capacity  to  maintain 
sustainable government finances and sound money; and their ability to 
put  in  place  an  institutional  environment  in  which  contracts  can  be 
enforced  and  property  rights  can  be  established.  I  would  challenge 
anyone to identify a country that has done all three of these things and 








  What  are  the  political  requirements  for  a  country  to  achieve  successful  economic 
growth?    These  are  often  thought  of  in  terms  of  democracy  and  an  associated  liberal 
economic  system  in  which  most  goods,  services  and  resources  are  allocated  through  a 
system of interacting markets.  However, while not entirely wrong, this is much too simple a 
view of the world, since democracy per se is neither necessary nor sufficient for economic 
growth and the term ‘liberal economic system’ is much too vague to be helpful.  We all think 
we know what it means, but when pushed to be specific, I imagine we would each want to 
highlight different aspects of the system as its key or essential features.   
  Moreover, the sorts of answer we would offer would most likely depend on the part of 
the world on which our attention was most strongly focussed.  To illustrate this, let me give 
three examples.  First, Commission (2001) is considering governance within the EU, so it 
naturally takes for granted that functioning states are in place, along with the rule of law and 
much of the regulatory framework we take for granted in developed, market-type economies.  
This is why the report is able to dwell on what can only be considered relatively high-level 
and fine-tuning aspects of governance, to do with transparency, information flows, improving 
accountability, and making policies more effective and coherent.  One can hardly disagree 
with the attention given to such matters, but they don’t have much resonance or relevance 
for other parts of the world. 
  Second, and in marked contrast to this, Keefer (2006) is concerned with governance 
in China and India.  Neither country is considered to have better than average values for key 
governance indicators, though both took off economically in the wake of some significant 
improvements, and both have better governance than do many other low-income countries.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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Also, the sheer size of each country proved helpful since it facilitated competition between 
regions, together with experimentation and learning - thus Keefer argues that a small state 
with the same quality of governance would have grown far more slowly than did China and, 
more recently, India.  The key was to reach a point where the government in each country 
could make credible commitments to entrepreneurs that they would be permitted to enjoy the 
fruits  of  their  investments  (i.e.  without  fear  of  expropriation).    Such  a  fundamental  issue 
doesn’t even rate a passing mention in Commission (2001), of course. 
  Last, CfA (2006) raises concerns about economic and political governance in Africa.  
This report sees governance in even more basic terms, as the question whether there is an 
effective state in place, or not.  While emphasising that state-building per se is largely for the 
African countries themselves, the report does also suggest ways in  which the developed 
countries can help the process , notably by supporting capacity-building and accountability.  
In the African context, the latter means a lot more than it might in the EU, since it includes 
measures to do with budgetary transparency to make it harder for elites to plunder natural 
resource revenues; and measures to tackle corruption and assist the repatriation of stolen 
state assets. 
  Governance is also increasingly discussed at the level of individual enterprises in 
developing  countries,  where  it  has  a  part  to  play  in  facilitating  the  financing  of  new 
investments,  especially  when  financial  markets  themselves  are  also  evolving  and 
strengthening in the countries concerned.  Thus Oman (2003) presents four detailed case 
studies  of  Brazil,  Chile,  India  and  South  Africa  to  illustrate  the  importance  of  good 
governance at the corporate level.  These studies distinguish between relationship-based 
and rules-based systems of corporate governance, arguing that a transition to the latter is 
critical for long-run economic growth based on productivity improvements. 
  Given such diverse ideas about governance, my aim in this paper is to stand back 
somewhat from the specific economic system we are most familiar with in order to examine 
some broader questions, namely: 
 
•  What  does  the  available  evidence  tell  us  about  the  political  and  institutional 
requirements for sustained economic growth? (Section I) 
•  What do we need from the state to secure growth? (Section II) 
•  How do a country’s internal characteristics support or impede its growth? (Section III) 
•  How  does  the  external  environment  of  a  country  influence  its  economic  growth 
prospects? (Section IV) Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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•  How can we put together the various elements to formulate a useful model of growth 
processes  (Section  V),  and  hence  draw  conclusions  for  the  most  appropriate 
governance arrangements in different countries, including both the political economy 
and the business/enterprise aspects (Section VI)? 
 
  Through  addressing  these  questions,  I  shall  arrive  at  some  findings  about 
governance around the world - both at the political and at the business levels - that will be 
highly relevant to the overall theme of this conference.  These findings fall into two main 
groups.    The  first  is  a  set  of  more  general  observations  about  important  aspects  of 
governance applicable to any country.  The second group will adapt and specialise these 
general observations to bring out some particularly interesting findings applicable in different 
ways to the diverse countries of the Eurasian land mass. By the end, I hope that we shall 
achieve both a better understanding of the growth processes and experiences that can be 
observed  across  Eurasia  in  recent  decades,  and  learn  from  these  to  help  design  better 
policies  for  those  countries  still  striving  to  achieve  more  rapid  and  sustainable  economic 
growth. 
  The  paper  outlines  a  simple  framework  within  which  to  think  about  the  political 
economy of growth that can be summed up in five points: good government, with secure 
political conditions; credible macroeconomic stability; savings and investment high enough to 
sustain  adequate growth;  openness to  the  world  economy;  and  the  discipline  of  external 
engagement. 
 
  It then argues that the growth model needs to be underpinned by suitable governance 
arrangements,  and  suggests  that  good  governance  has  two  main  elements,  each  quite 
complex in practice, namely: protection of property rights, and accountability of government. 
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I. The Evidence 
 
  To explain why some countries grow and become richer, while others languish in 
poverty, is one of the great challenges of economics.  Not surprisingly, many studies have 
been done to identify the conditions that appear to be most conducive to sustained growth, 
though  much  is  still  not  fully  understood  in  this  extensive  literature,  and  much  remains 
controversial.   
  Setting out from the simplest possible growth model leads to the idea that economic 
growth ought to depend principally on the growth of factor inputs (notably capital and labour, 
possibly  also  land;  and  the  inputs  may  also  be  quality-adjusted  in  an  appropriate  way), 
together with growth in overall productivity.  The latter term tends to appear as a ‘catch all’ 
term that picks up any elements not covered by the growth of factor inputs, and so it is often 
decomposed further into a variety of sub-components.  This is what results in much of the 
diversity in the associated empirical literature on the question of growth. 
  The  initial  focus  on  factor  inputs  directs  attention  towards  investment,  which 
increases the capital stock, as well as towards diverse education and training activities that 
boost the effective labour force by enhancing labour force quality.  From reviewing growth 
experience in many countries, it is clear that moderate to high rates of investment, usually at 
least 20% of a country’s GDP, have to be considered a necessary condition for sustained 
growth, most of this investment being funded from domestic savings.  It is very rare for FDI, 
for instance, to contribute more than a fairly modest fraction of a country’s total investment 
outlays.    A  high  rate  of  investment,  however,  is  definitely  not  sufficient  to  ensure  rapid 
growth, since the investment actually undertaken can turn out to be extremely inefficient, as 
was  the  case  in  most  of  the  former  communist  countries  in  at  least  the  last  decade  of 
communist rule.  Hence it is critical to have in place adequate institutions to ensure that the 
selection  processes  determining  which  investment  projects  are  implemented  and  which 
rejected reward productive projects - at least on average, since some mistakes are bound to 
occur - and generally penalise bad ones.  Among other things, this means that investment 
projects should not be selected as a political favour to some interest group, or as an element 
in state patronage. 
  As regards labour force developments, countries mostly fall into two principal groups.  
In  countries  where  a  large  fraction  of  the  workforce  is  still  employed  in  low-productivity 
agriculture,  or  in  out-dated,  inefficient  industry,  much  growth  can  be  achieved  by  the Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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movement of workers out of these sectors into faster growing, higher productivity sectors 
such as more sophisticated manufacturing and the services sectors.  Much of the workforce 
might  still  be  poorly  educated,  and  lack  modern  skills,  but  shifting  workers  into  higher 
productivity sectors boosts output and economic growth.  In time, this approach reaches its 
limits, when there are no more low- productivity sectors from which workers can be drawn.  
In countries like this, our second group, growth can only be sustained through continuous 
improvements in productivity brought about through constant innovation and modernisation 
of production, and by improving educational standards to boost labour-force quality.  The 
innovation aspect of this analysis was strongly emphasised in Parente and Prescott (2002), 
who  concluded  that  support  for  and  receptiveness  to  innovation  were  fundamental  for 
sustained growth nowadays.  Ireland is a country that has adopted this approach for over two 
decades now with notable success, its relative income within the EU rising very substantially 
since 1980 or so. 
  So far, of course, this discussion has only dealt with the supply side of economic 
growth,  but  no  country  can  achieve  and  sustain  growth  unless  there  is  also  a  growing 
demand for the resulting output.  This demand can, in principle, stem from any of the main 
components  of  aggregate  demand  that  we  normally  distinguish  in  the  national  accounts, 
namely personal consumption, public consumption, investment and net exports.  We now 
comment on each in turn. 
  As countries grow, we normally expect real wages to rise, living standards to improve, 
so increases in personal consumption are very likely to contribute to the rising demand that 
keeps  growth  going.    Indeed  it  is  quite  hard  to  understand  what  growth  is  for,  if  not  to 
improve the living standards of the population.  Consequently, there is not much to say about 
this component, except that it clearly cannot contribute much to the expansion of demand if a 
country  chooses  to  hold  down  wages  quite  strongly.    As  regards  investment  (which 
comprises both investment in fixed capital, and stock building), while its share in GDP is 
rising to a level appropriate for sustaining moderate to rapid growth, its growth can provide 
part of the required expansion in total demand.  But once the share of investment has risen 
to its desired level, it will contribute only in proportion to that share. 
  This  leaves  the  two  most  interesting  components  of  demand,  namely  public 
consumption and net exports.  On the former, total government spending consists of public 
consumption (government demand for goods and services) plus transfer payments such as 
social security spending (unemployment pay, income support, publicly provided pensions, 
and the like).  Transfer payments essentially redistribute incomes within the private sector, 
and to that extent might contribute a little to aggregate demand (by shifting income from Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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those with a low marginal propensity to consume to those with a much higher one), but they 
require taxation to finance them, with its associated deadweight losses.  Likewise, funding 
the government’s demand for goods and services - which means defence spending, outlays 
on publicly funded health and education services, public administration, and so on - also 
requires taxation unless the government is willing to rely heavily on deficit spending and 
monetary emissions.  While such a tactic is commonly observed, it is well known to be highly 
undesirable given the general desideratum to maintain sound macroeconomic conditions as 
a background condition for growth. 
  There  is  considerable  evidence  that  higher  government  spending  as  a  fraction  of 
GDP, typically associated with higher taxes, is harmful for economic growth.  Thus Barro 
(1991)  found  that  across  a  large  sample  of  countries,  cutting  the  share  of  government 
spending in GDP (where spending here means both government consumption plus transfer 
payments) by 10 percentage points would raise the average growth rate of per capita GDP 
by about 1.2% per annum, a substantial gain.  In the rich countries of Western Europe, the 
combination  of  high  government  spending  (with  the  associated  high  tax  rates)  and  slow 
growth might not be too bad since living standards are already high, but for poorer countries 
wishing to catch up it would be an economic disaster.  Hence it is rather reassuring to learn 
from  Åslund  (2006)  that  the  CIS  countries,  mostly  growing  rapidly  since  the  late  1990s 
financial crisis that hit the region, have opted for quite low shares of government spending in 
GDP, around 25% or so, in contrast to the much higher shares adopted by most of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (typically around 45% of GDP).  Åslund (2006) also 
makes the interesting point that in countries with relatively weak, not very capable, and often 
corrupt states, it is also helpful for growth to keep government spending down.  To put it 
another way, bad government had better be small government. 
  Now  consider  foreign  trade,  the  role  of  exports  and  imports  in  supporting growth.  
Sometimes, when countries liberalise their trade as part of some ‘reform package’, they find 
that imports rise rapidly while exports languish, resulting in trade deficits and concerns about 
the credibility of the original liberalisation.  Moreover, if net exports (exports less imports) are 
becoming increasingly negative, far from promoting and supporting overall economic growth, 
they slow it down.  Nevertheless, most of the countries that have grown rapidly in the past 
few decades have done so on the basis of an increasingly strong engagement with the world 
economy, with exports growing much faster than GDP as a whole, the share of exports in 
GDP therefore rising quite sharply over a decade or so.  From this perspective, the ‘trick’, if I 
may express it that way, is for countries to find goods and services that they can export Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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competitively onto the world market in increasing volumes.  Countries with reserves of oil and 
gas, or plentiful supplies of other important minerals and raw materials (such as copper, 
timber), have a good starting point, though their success is also subject to the vagaries of 
commodity  market  price  fluctuations.    Elsewhere,  we  can  at  least  see  ex  post  what  has 
proved  to  be  successful  in  given  countries:  an  increasingly  wide  range  of  manufactured 
goods in China, software and other business-related services in India, electronic products 
from Taiwan, and so on.  The trouble is, few of us could have predicted ex ante exactly what 
would be successful in which country.  This unfortunate fact makes it quite hard to offer 
concrete  advice  to  new  countries  seeking  to  embark  on  export-led  growth.    In  practice, 
countries have to try out a variety of different products in the world market and only then will 
they discover what will work for them.  Picking winners is rarely a good strategy. 
  However, we do know that deliberate disengagement from the world economy is a 
seriously bad policy.  This was undoubtedly a factor in the poor performance of the former 
socialist countries from the 1970s onwards, for instance, their share of world trade declining 
steadily over the period. The centralised planning system paid little attention to comparative 
advantage, and treated trade as a minor extension of the domestic economic balances.   A 
similar disengagement was also a factor in China’s relatively weak economic performance 
before the internal reforms and economic opening that started in the early 1980s (soon after 
successful  agricultural  reforms  in  the  late  1970s).    More  recently,  Broadman  (2006)  has 
argued that, based on their current policies and practices, the former socialist countries fall 
into two groups as regards their engagement with the world economy.  Thus the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics are viewed as being fully engaged, encouraging 
FDI  and  extensive  modernisation  to  shift  their  exports  towards  products  requiring  more 
sophisticated technology and yielding higher value added, while much of the CIS is tending 
to be more inward looking, trading with each other on the basis of older technology, more 
out-dated  products,  and  not  engaging  so  much  with  the  wider  world  economy.    For  the 
moment, the CIS approach cannot be regarded as too dreadful, since the region, as we 
noted above, is growing very strongly.  But Broadman (2006) does question whether current 
growth  will  prove  sustainable  without  more  open  trade  policies.    The  countries  of  South 
Eastern Europe are tending towards the CIS approach to trade policy, inward looking and not 
very supportive of exports, tending to protect established firms long after their ‘sell-by date’.  
Broadman suggests, correctly I think, that such small countries can only grow and do well by 
adopting strongly export-oriented policies, and hence aligning themselves - in terms of trade 
policy - far more with the rest of Central and Eastern Europe.  It remains to be seen whether 
they will do so. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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  Much  of  sub-Saharan  Africa  is  poorly  involved  in  the  world  economy,  again  with 
declining shares of world trade since 1960.  This has resulted from a complex mix of poorly 
designed policies and weak institutions, and effective remedies are not easy to design and 
implement.    What  is  quite  unmistakable,  though,  is  the  outcome  of  generally  lagging 
economic performance, with only the last few years looking a little brighter. 
  Considering  wider  issues  for  a  moment,  Dixit  (2005)  reviews  much  of  the  recent 
literature  on  what  he  terms  ‘recipes’  for  successful  growth.    Some  of  this  is  based  on 
approaches to growth that became fashionable for a time, such as the early postwar fashion 
for  development  planning,  and  some  approaches  based  on  the  experience  of  particular 
countries deemed to be success stories.  The trouble with these is that success rarely lasts, 
and  as  soon  as  one  particular  development  model  comes  to  be  advocated  widely,  the 
countries on which it was based encounter problems.  This reflects the sheer difficulty of fully 
understanding  development  processes,  and  our  failure  to  construct  any  generally  valid 
models.  It also reflects, as Dixit points out, the widespread tendency to neglect the key 
factor of ‘luck’, which plays a notable part in explaining the postwar economic success of 
countries such as Japan, among others. 
  From the econometric work that Dixit surveys, it appears that various geographical 
factors  have  been found  to  be  significant.   Thus  being  land-locked,  and  being  a tropical 
country, are factors sometimes found to be disadvantageous, though it remains unclear what 
any so afflicted country is supposed to do about it (and in any event, the evidence is mixed)!  
Institutional factors are perhaps more interesting, since institutions can be changed, albeit 
not easily.  However, the institutional features found to be most significant are such things as 
openness to foreign trade - which we discussed above - and legal arrangements to protect 
property rights and business contracts, sometimes summed up as an aspect of the ‘rule of 
law’ (see Dam, 2006).  These can take many concrete forms, and the econometric work 
provides few clues that could assist us in advising countries on exactly what legal framework 
they should adopt to support private sector business.   In any case, this whole area, has 
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II. The State 
 
   
  What  do  we  expect  from  the  state  when  thinking  about  its  role  in  processes  of 
economic  growth?    First,  and  most  fundamentally,  we  would  expect  the  state  to  have  a 
monopoly  over  the  means  of  enforcing  order  in  the  given  country,  so  that  it  can  protect 
property rights and business contracts, levy taxation, and manage the public budget.  This 
entails state control over the armed forces, as well as the police and other security forces.  It 
also implies that the state is not faced with competing warlords or militias claiming to control 
certain parts of the country.  This requirement implies that a number of territories around the 
world cannot be said to possess a fully functioning state.  For instance, think of Afghanistan, 
Lebanon, Somalia, Palestine, Iraq, and a few others. 
  Defining the key characteristic of the state in this way raises two questions: (a) What 
is to stop the military from simply taking over full control of the state, e.g. by means of a 
coup?
1  (b) If the state is strong enough to protect property rights, what is to stop it from over-
riding these rights and expropriating private agents when they turn out to be successful in 
their business ventures?  The short answer is ‘not much’, but a longer answer would have to 
refer  to  ‘history,  experience  and  custom’.    Establishing  the  ‘rule  of  law’,  meaning  both 
effective civilian control over the military, and the protection of private property rights and 
business contracts from state predation and general criminal activity, has proved extremely 
difficult in the countries where it can be said to be firmly in place.   
  In  the  UK,  for  example,  it  took  civil  war  (in  the  seventeenth  century)  and  major 
reforms of parliament for the latter to wrest control over the government’s budget from the 
sovereign; and the judiciary has long cherished its independence from the executive.  In the 
US,  the  Constitution  was  deliberately  designed with  a  separation  of  powers  between  the 
executive (President and his cabinet), the legislature (the House of Representatives, and the 
Senate), and the courts (especially the Supreme Court).  The resulting system can appear 
extremely cumbersome and messy, but the diverse checks and balances built into it provide 
considerable protection - both from governmental interference and from wrongful behaviour 
by other private agents - for private business entities.  
  In  contrast,  it  is  useful  to  remark  on  a  major  country  such  as  Russia,  where  the 
concept of ‘rule of law’ is not well understood, and is certainly not a routine part of the way in 
which economic governance is thought about.  It may well be the case that the Russian Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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military are reasonably well under civilian control.  But it is harder to claim that the judiciary is 
yet fully independent of political processes, though it is undoubtedly rather more so than it 
was under the former communist system.  And for business, both small and large, there 
remains a significant gulf between the laws formally in place, and their implementation at 
grass-roots level.  In addition, it remains far too easy for the state itself to take action - which 
to the outsider can appear little short of capricious - against particular businessmen who 
might have fallen out of favour (e.g. Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the Yukos affair), or against 
particular companies suddenly judged to be on the point of making too much money (e.g. 
Shell’s activities on Sakhalin Island)
2.  Such actions seriously undermine the ‘rule of law’.  
Meanwhile, other companies apparently behaving badly get away with it because they are 
perceived to enjoy high-level political protection: e.g. Gazprom. 
  How,  then  can  we  make  a  state  accountable,  and  limit  its  scope  for  arbitrary 
intervention, either in relation to the government’s own actions or in relation to the private 
sector?  It is often claimed that democracy per se, in the limited sense of periodic voting to 
choose both parliamentary representatives and the government, plays a major role in this 
respect.    It  does  play  a  role,  certainly,  but  I  would  be  cautious  about  placing  too  much 
reliance upon it.  For there are many states where voting takes place from time to time, 
where  it  would  be  difficult  to  have  much  confidence  in  the  electorate’s  effectiveness  in 
constraining executive power.   
  More  positively,  however,  there  is  evidence  that  where  an  elected  parliament 
effectively controls the government’s budget, scrutiny over public spending is greater, the 
higher is the prevailing tax rate.  Ironically, this suggests that a government that chooses not 
to tax very much can do pretty much what it likes since it will face little scrutiny - so what 
taxes it raises can be allocated quite corruptly, and can be misappropriated with little risk of 
serious challenge.  This is indeed the situation in more than a few countries.   
  It turns out, too, that possession of substantial natural resources, such as oil or gas, 
is not only - on average - bad for growth
3, but it also undermines any democratic scrutiny of 
public  spending  since  the  government  can spend  a  lot  without  having  to  raise much tax 
revenue.   This  aspect  is  discussed  in  a recent  paper,  Collier  and  Hoeffler  (2005),  which 
sketches  a  simple  model  in  which  high  resource  rents  both  weaken  public  scrutiny  and 
strengthen patronage politics; the paper finds considerable empirical evidence to support the 
hypotheses it develops.  Resource-rich countries where public scrutiny is weak, and where 
much  money  is  undoubtedly  diverted  into  improper  channels,  would  include  Nigeria  and 
Saudi Arabia.  However, resources are not always bad news, since Kazakhstan appears to Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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be performing remarkably well (no doubt with some corruption, but not enough to slow down 
the  country’s  rapid  growth),  and  Norway  has  apparently  managed  its  natural  resources 
exceptionally well, with almost no reported corruption. 
  Though not discussed in the Collier and Hoeffler paper, it seems to me that aid flows 
to some countries could play the same role in the political process as resource rents, and 
hence  might  have  similar  undesirable  effects  on  the  political  aspects  of  economic 
governance. 
  Not only should governments be accountable for their budgetary spending, but the 
bureaucracy should be accountable for delivering and implementing the government policies 
that have been approved.  Making a civil service accountable in this way is not easy.  In part 
it is a matter of employing staff who are sufficiently well trained and sufficiently professional 
to want to do a good job, perhaps guided by some form of civil service code of behaviour.  
But  if  it  were  that  simple,  accountability  in  this  sense  would  not  be  regarded  as  the 
widespread problem that it is.  Some of the problems that impede accountability include the 
shortage  of  personnel  with  the  right  education  and  training;  the  lack  of  transparency  at 
various  levels  of  government  (e.g.  how  can  anyone  monitor  funding  of,  say,  secondary 
schools if the education ministry fails to publish any information about its funding allocation?); 
weak management of staff (why should teachers be diligent when no one even monitors and 
reports on their attendance?); low wages that provide an incentive to seek out opportunities 
for corruption; over-complex rules and regulations that provide these very opportunities; and 
so on.  The problems are usually easier to list than the solutions, unfortunately. 
  When  government  failure  is  pervasive,  it  is  also  important  to  ask  what  sorts  of 
economic transactions can still take place, effectively in the absence of a properly functioning 
legal framework. One naturally thinks here of small-scale, local trading networks, in which 
various  forms  of  informal  mechanisms  can  arise  to  police  transactions  (some  interesting 
models of such trading networks can be found in Dixit, 2004; Fafchamps, 2004; and Greif, 
2006).  However, even larger scale business can be conducted without having a proper legal 
setting.  Russian business in the early to mid-1990s is a case in point, where much anecdotal 
evidence  suggests  that mafia-like  organisations  quickly  emerged  to  ‘help’  settle  business 
disputes and enforce contracts.  Such private sector solutions do, to an extent, work, but I 
suspect  they  would  not  be  widely  considered  especially  desirable.    Moreover,  in  such 
conditions,  the  property  rights  that  get  protected  are  presumably  those  of  the  (relatively 
wealthy and well connected) people who can pay for the necessary services. 
  There  is  a  presumption  in  the  above  discussion  that  if  property  rights  are  to  be 
protected,  or  contracts  honoured,  then  this  must  be  ensured  by  the  state  exercising Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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sovereignty over the territory concerned.  But this need not always be the case.  In the case 
of failed states such as Somalia, some business can be pursued using the legal or banking 
system of an agreed Middle Eastern country, and such deals are reportedly quite common.  
And even for states that operate perfectly well, many international business deals specify, as 
part of any contract, which country’s law shall be used in the event of a dispute - it need not 
be the law of either contracting party, but can be the law of some agreed third country whose 
legal system is widely respected. 
  In thinking about the state and its various roles in economic development, there are a 
couple  of  final  observations  worth  making  here.    First,  there  is  the  broad  question  of 
causality, namely whether good institutions foster growth or the other way around.  To what 
extent  does  growth  itself  encourage  the  development  of  good  institutions,  including  an 
effective state?  The evidence about this is decidedly mixed and ambiguous.  However, I 
would not personally advise a country to wait until its state was set up properly before it 
sought to embark on some type of growth-promoting or enhancing strategy.  In practice, 
countries start from where they are, and we all have to live with that. 
  Second, there is the interesting tendency for clearly bad political institutions to persist.  
This has been investigated theoretically by Acemoglu (2006), in a model with various groups 
competing for power where it can be to the advantage of a group in power - in effect - to 
impoverish  other  groups  in  order  to  retain  power.    A  fairly  extreme  instance  of  this 
phenomenon is probably Bolivia, the only country in South America whose per capita income 
is almost the same now as it was back in 1950 (in other South American countries, real 
incomes have at least doubled) (see Wiggins et al., 2006).  The rich elite have been close 
enough to political power to ensure that their property rights would be protected, without 
them having to pay much attention to those of other groups.  Now that a more radical leader, 
Morales,  has  finally  been  elected,  it  is  interesting  to  speculate  whether  he  will  seek  to 
fundamentally redistribute wealth by expropriating the rich - but thereby risking a military 
coup that might reverse his reforms - or whether he will be clever enough to redistribute only 
moderately, increasing the chance (in my view) of bringing about a more lasting change in 
Bolivian politics. In general, very strong interest groups in a society can constrain change, 
and hence lead to the persistence of inefficient political institutions.  Often, our understanding 
of the mechanisms of political and economic change is insufficient to enable us to do much 
about such situations, except, perhaps, at a time of major economic crisis when even the 
elite might be persuaded to accept some changes. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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III. Internal Conditions for Growth 
 
  Much of what we need to say here has at least been touched on above, so it will be 
possible to be quite brief, and simply present a series of points to sum up the position.  In 
doing so, it is tempting to be as comprehensive as possible, but that runs the risk of forcing 
us to conclude that sustained growth is either unlikely or impossible.  Casual observation, 
however,  suffices  to  show  how  wrong  such  a  conclusion  would  be.    Hence  we  need  to 
distinguish  between  a  limited  number  of  internal  conditions  that  should  be  considered 
essential for growth, and a possibly longer list of conditions generally found to be helpful, that 




•  Political stability.  Governments may be weak or strong, more or less democratic, but 
private sector development is not helped by a strong perception of political instability, 
with a high risk of coups, civil war, possible reversals of earlier major reforms, and the 
like.    Some  interesting  theoretical  analysis  of  the  conditions  for  political  stability, 
including  the  conditions  for  democratic  consolidation,  is  presented  in  depth  in 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).  Further analysis of the economics of government 
failure and the principles of good government can be found in Besley (2006). 
 
•  Macroeconomic stability.  It is hard to be precise here, but it is clear that countries 
with  inflation  rates  in  excess  of  100%  almost  never  exhibit  economic  growth.  
Similarly, countries usually find that government deficits exceeding 10% of GDP are 
rarely sustainable for long, and the same can be said for large trade deficits except in 
a few cases where countries are able to attract sustained FDI inflows to offset a trade 
deficit.  It is important not only that macroeconomic policies are conducive to stability 
in this fairly loose sense, but that the macroeconomic stance should be credible to the 
private sector. 
 
•  Investment of around 20% of GDP or higher.  Except in short recovery periods (such 
as following a war, or a deep recession), almost no country has sustained growth for 
long without achieving high rates of savings and investment.  As noted above, this Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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investment  does,  of  course,  also  need  to  be  efficiently  allocated  to  productive 
projects. 
 
  This is all that I would consider essential, but there are many other conditions that I 
would regard as desirable, and for which there is a good deal of empirical support from 




•  Steadily  improving  quality  of  labour  force,  as  a  result  of  improved  education  and 
training. 
 
•  Improving  quality  of  capital  stock  as  a  result  of  policies  to  encourage  innovation, 
technological upgrading, R&D, and the like. 
 
•  Appropriate  microeconomic  conditions  need  to  be  in  place,  namely:  competition 
policy,  the  legal  framework  for  business,  other  elements  of  the  business  and 
investment environments in general (see World Bank, 2006; World Bank, 2004). 
 
•  Appropriate institutional conditions are also desirable, including conditions for good 
governance, both political and at company level. 
 
 
IV. The External Environment 
 
  The  external  environment  of  a  country  offers  both  constraints,  opportunities  and 
challenges, some helpful for growth, others less so.  Not much has been said about the 
various features of a country’s external environment in previous sections of this paper, and 
so our discussion here will need to be substantially more elaborate than our brief remarks 
above on the internal environment. 
  A  clearly  negative  factor  for  growth  is  involvement  in  a  war  with  a  neighbouring 
country,  or  in  civil  war.    Not  only  do  such  events  distract  policymakers’  attention  from 
relatively  mundane  issues  of  economic  policy,  but  the  fighting  damages  and  destroys Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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productive assets, diverts key manpower from production, and seriously disrupts access to 
markets.    It  also  encourages  out-migration,  often  of  the  best  educated  and  most  skilled 
segments  of  the  population.    All  this  was  evident,  for  instance,  in  the  fighting  between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, in the Yugoslav wars of the early to mid-1990s, 
in Tajikistan’s and Georgia’s civil strife, and in many other places.  Nearly as bad is the 
situation of countries whose neighbours or major trading partners are engaged in warfare, or 
threatening warfare, since the external political stability that is generally helpful for economic 
development is then not assured. 
  Once political stability is assured - both internally and externally - it is natural to think 
next of the various modalities of engagement with the world economy.  Deferring discussion 
of  international  alliances  and  international  institutions,  the  four  main  aspects  of  this 
engagement are: (a) trade; (b) FDI; (c) migration; and (d) remittances.  We already discussed 
trade and FDI briefly above, emphasising their benefits.   
  Migration, if it is mainly out-migration of the relatively skilled, is a mixed blessing.  On 
the  one  hand,  it  usually  reflects the  lack  of  well  paid  jobs  for  skilled  workers  in  a  given 
economy (which one hopes would, in due course, be overcome as the economy starts to 
grow), but on the other, migrating workers often send back to their families in the home 
country  a  share  of  their  income  -  remittances  -  and  these  flows  sometimes  provide  a 
significant share of a country’s foreign exchange earnings.  Often, migrating workers will 
return home after a few years, bringing both new skills, and often some capital, with them.  In 
that case, temporary migration can be very beneficial.  But in less favourable cases, some 
countries  are  left  with  almost  no  highly  educated  personnel,  almost  no  one  with  modern 
skills.  Breaking out of such a position is then immensely hard, since even primary school 
teachers, nurses, middle-level civil servants may be in terribly short supply.  This issue was 
highlighted, for Africa, in CfA (2005), though convincing and effective remedies were not well 
developed there. 
  Overall, then, trade and FDI are normally beneficial to a country, while the balance of 
advantage in regard to migration and remittances is mixed.  It can also change over time, of 
course.    Ireland  is  a  good  example  of  that,  with  decades  of  out-migration  reversing 
substantially  in  the  past  couple  of  decades,  as  sustained  growth  and  rising  incomes 
increasingly made the country an attractive place to work, with lots of new job opportunities.  
Former emigrants, as well as many non-Irish workers, flocked to the country to participate in 
its economic boom. 
  For  many  countries,  the  international  context  of  their  engagement  with  the  world 
economy is defined by the various agreements and organizations they belong to.  At the Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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simplest level, this mostly means their membership of various free trade areas (FTAs) or 
Customs Unions (CUs), and their membership or otherwise of the WTO.  Much of the world 
is covered by a variety of FTAs, of which the best known outside Eurasia (to which we revert 
below)  are  probably  NAFTA,  Mercosur  (large  parts  of  South  America),  and  the  ASEAN 
(South-East Asia) FTA.  In Africa, too, there are many FTAs, some bilateral, some covering 
groups of countries.  Indeed so complex is the pattern of FTAs on the continent that some 
observers have described it as a ‘spaghetti bowl’.   Most of the agreements are not fully 
implemented, with most African countries still lacking the technically trained staff to do so 
effectively, and in practice the excessive complexity almost certainly serves to inhibit rather 
than  encourage trade (especially  as  each  agreement tends to  include  its  own  provisions 
regarding ‘rules of origin’; see Krishna, 2006). 
  Across the Eurasian landmass the picture regarding trade agreements is extremely 
mixed.  For China, there are trade agreements with the EU and the USA, plus a growing list 
of bilateral agreements between China and mostly Asian partners; the idea of forming a large 
FTA encompassing the ASEAN countries plus China has also been mooted, and preparatory 
work  is  under  way.    For  the  CIS  countries,  there  is  an  FTA  covering  all  twelve  states.  
However, this was agreed in 1994, and has never been ratified by all CIS members, so it 
cannot  be  regarded  as  especially  effective.    Since  the  mid-1990s  there  has  been  a  CU 
among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and later, Tajikistan, but this too has never 
been fully ratified, the agreement sets out no timetable for implementation of the CU, and 
little  has  been  done  to  harmonise  either  inter-group  or  external  tariffs  or  other  trade 
provisions.    This  CU  became  the  Eurasian  Economic  Area  in  2000,  at  the  instigation  of 
Kazakhstan, but there remains little meaningful progress to report. 
  Within the CIS, the situation of Kyrgyzstan is not untypical.  As noted, the country 
belongs to the CIS FTA and the above mentioned CU.  It also has bilateral FTAs with nine 
other CIS members, and belongs to several other multi-state preferential trading agreements, 
some  involving  states  outside  the  CIS.    The  WTO  has  warned  that  this  complexity  can 
undermine  the  transparency  of  Kyrgyzstan’s  otherwise  rather  open  and  liberal  trade  and 
investment regime, and can tend to lock the country into inefficient trade with CIS partners.  
Countries often seem to think that agreeing to lots of trade deals can help them to integrate 
more  effectively  with  the  world  economy,  but  unfortunately,  the  opposite  is  the  case, 
especially where the state is relatively weak and lacks the administrative capacity to manage 
all the deals it signs up to. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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  Moving West, the EU is now by far the world’s largest and most effective CU, with 27 
member states since the latest accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007.  Within 
the  Union,  internal  tariffs  are  zero,  and  the  common  external  tariff  is  fully  implemented.  
While  some  temporary  restrictions  on  the  movement  of  labour  are  in  force  for  the  new 
member states, for the most part the EU fully implements the so called four freedoms: the 
free movement of goods, services, capital and labour across the Union.  All member states 
have benefited greatly from the rapid growth of intra-EU trade, and from the EU’s trade with 
other parts of the world.  Moreover, although the EU does sometimes bow to sectoral lobbies 
and impose special trade restrictions from time to time (e.g. textiles trade with China since 
mid-2005, footwear trade with China since mid-2006), and imposes some quotas on imports 
from non-members of the WTO (e.g. on steel imports from Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan), 
the Union’s general stance is to favour open and liberal trade.  This is notwithstanding the 
special  provisions  in  force  regarding  the  agricultural  sector,  as  part  of  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy.  Since trade policy matters are handled at EU level, the EU has often 
been  able  to  prevent  member  states from restricting  imports to  protect  specific  domestic 
firms in distress.  This relatively tough approach has undoubtedly contributed, over the years, 
towards enhancing the competitiveness of EU exporters.  In this sense, membership of the 
EU serves as an external constraint - and mostly a very desirable one - on the governments 
of member states. 
  For the recent accession states, the eight transition economies that joined the EU in 
May  2004  plus  the  two  new  ones,  the  prospect  of  EU membership  also  constrained  the 
governments of these states.  It did so, essentially, because the EU required all the incoming 
states  to  implement  pretty  much  the  entire  acquis  communautaire  into  their  respective 
domestic  legislation,  and  the  process  of  doing  so  -  once  accession  approached,  and  a 
timetable  was  set  out  -  was  subject  to  annual  monitoring  and  reporting  by  the  EU
4.  
Frequently, when implementing reforms, governments of the accession states were able to 
refer to, and indeed to blame, the EU for what they were doing, and this did help to get some 
reforms  through  against  domestic  opposition.    Though  implementing  the  acquis  thus 
compelled  the  incoming  states  to  complete  the  economic  reforms  needed  to  construct 
functioning market-type economies, it also required them to take on board a lot of measures 
that, without the prospect of EU membership, one would not have wished to recommend.  In 
this sense, the acquis is more than a little top heavy for a set of mostly small and not very 
prosperous states.  However, the governments concerned evidently took the view that it was 
a price worth paying for the ultimate benefits of full membership - let us hope their judgement 
proves correct.  For countries with no prospect of eventual EU membership, such as Russia, Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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for instance, one might well wish to see more liberal economic reforms, but I seriously doubt 
whether many economists would advise Russia to seek much guidance from the provisions 
of the EU’s acquis communautaire.    
  Besides the acquis itself, the accession states also had to convince the EU of two 
other  conditions,  namely  that  they  were  stable  democracies  (held  to  include  respecting 
minority  rights  and  supporting  the  ‘rule  of  law’),  and  that  their  economies  were  able  to 
withstand competition from the existing EU member states
5.  This led to some interesting 
situations where pressure from the EU required the incoming states to protect significant 
minorities,  such  as  Hungarians  in  Slovakia  and  Romania,  gypsy  populations  in  several 
countries, and ironically, Russians in the Baltic States. 
  The  new  member  states  of  the  Union  are  expected,  in  due  course,  to  join  the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and to adopt the Euro as their currency (no other countries 
are to be permitted the British opt out).  Slovenia has already made the Euro its official 
currency as from January 2007, as a key stage in that process, but the other new member 
states  are  still  probably  some  years  behind.  This  is  because  they  need  to  manage  their 
economies in order to fully satisfy the Maastricht criteria which require: (a) inflation should be 
no more than 1½ % p.a. above the inflation rate of the three member states with lowest 
inflation; (b) the general government deficit should not exceed (other than for occasional 
short periods) 3% of GDP; and (c) the ratio of gross government debt to GDP should not 
exceed  60%  of  GDP  (there  are  some  other  lesser  conditions  that  we  leave  out  of 
consideration).    From  the  standpoint  of  maintaining  credibly  stable  macroeconomic 
conditions - emphasised above as vital for growth - it is hard to dispute the notion that some 
conditions  along  these  lines  could  be  helpful.    However,  I  am  aware  of  no  economic 
arguments for these particular reference numbers (i.e. 1½ %, 3% and 60%) to be used, and 
can only surmise that they were adopted because the original members of the Eurozone 
proved just about able to satisfy them - but could not have managed anything more stringent. 
  There is a risk that insistence on exactly this set of criteria might force some countries 
to deflate more than they would otherwise wish to, which could be damaging.  On the other 
hand, once firmly inside the zone there is a risk in the opposite direction, namely that some 
departures from the Maastricht conditions might be tolerated by the European Central Bank 
without any penalty being imposed on the errant member states.  Such departures might 
appear  perfectly  reasonable  in  the  short-term,  but  in  principle  they  do  nevertheless 
undermine  the  credibility  of  the  official  Eurozone  policy  stance.    The  disciplines  of  the 
Eurozone are, on balance, good for countries such as Italy that have tended to operate an Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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overly lax fiscal policy, and for the new member states where fiscal discipline is also not yet 
deeply  embedded  in  official  or  popular  thinking  about  the  economy.    In  this  sense,  the 
Eurozone  conditions  provide  a  valuable  external  anchor,  strongly  encouraging  sound 
domestic macroeconomic policy in the member states.  But for this to work, the conditions do 
need to be credibly enforced. 
  That said, it should be apparent by now that adoption of the acquis and adherence to 
the Maastricht conditions do not guarantee rapid economic growth for the member states of 
the Union, they merely provide a supportive framework, within which there is much scope for 
the exercise of domestic policy to support or hinder growth.  Thus individual member states 
grow at quite different rates, with both catching up and lagging behind from one decade to 
the next.  Sound macroeconomic policy is necessary but not sufficient for sustained, rapid 
growth.  Drawing on this, and previous sections, we discuss below what additional conditions 
ought to be in place for a country to grow strongly. 
  To  conclude  this  section,  we  briefly  consider  how  membership  of  international 
organisations  can  place  further  constraints  upon  a  country’s  domestic  economic  policies, 
sometimes  aiding  growth,  sometimes  possibly  not.    Several  states  in  Eurasia  receive 
assistance and advice from the World Bank and IMF, but for the most part their roles are so 
small as to seem fairly inconsequential for the purposes of the present analysis.  Accordingly, 
we  confine  attention  to  the  role  of  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO).    The  WTO’s 
principal task is to set and monitor the main rules that govern the conduct of international 
trade.  To this extent, the WTO sets constraints on all its member governments, as well as 
providing a disputes settlement mechanism to handle disagreements over trading matters.  It 
is easy to find fault with specific features of WTO rules, but probably better on balance for 
world trade to remain largely rules-based within the WTO framework; likely alternatives to the 
WTO, including a return to tit-for-tat protection around the world, are not very appealing, and 
are frankly quite dangerous for the health of the world economy. 
  The WTO exerts greater influence over countries seeking to join the organization, 
since it often seeks commitments not only regarding that country’s trade policy per se, but 
over many aspects of domestic policy considered to affect foreign trade indirectly.  Several 
countries across Eurasia have gone through this WTO accession process relatively recently 
and their Accession Protocols have indeed offered significant commitments regarding their 
domestic  economic  policies;  e.g.  Georgia,  2000;  Moldova,  2001;  China,  2001;  FYROM, 
2003; Armenia, 2003.  In these situations, the WTO, to some degree, not only serves as a 
useful  external  anchor  to  sustain  good  trade  policies,  but  also  helps  to  foster  improved Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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domestic  policies  in  some  areas,  such  as  competition  policy  and  energy  policy  (among 
others). 
  Some  important  countries  in  Eurasia  are  still  outside  the  WTO,  notably  Ukraine, 
Russia  and  Kazakhstan  (plus  a  few  other,  smaller  countries).    All  three  have  been  in 
negotiation  with  WTO  since  the  early  to  mid-1990s,  with  many  meetings  of  the  relevant 
Working Parties, but also many gaps in the negotiations when not much activity was going 
on.    Some  of  this  reflected  changes  of  government  or  economic  policy  in  the  countries 
concerned, affecting their changing perceptions of the urgency of WTO accession, and their 
willingness or otherwise to offer acceptable concessions to various trade partners.  At the 
time of writing, Ukraine seems close to concluding an agreement regarding its accession 
(entry may well occur by summer 2007), but the other two countries appear to need more 
time.  Since Ukraine’s economic growth is likely to depend heavily on success in exporting 
manufactured products, accession is especially important to ensure that Ukraine’s exports 
have secure access to their major markets.  For Russia and Kazakhstan, their major exports 
are energy products and raw materials, and these face few restrictions in the world market.  
Hence WTO accession is less urgent for them, though still valuable in the longer term as 




V. Assembling a Model 
 
  Bringing together the various elements discussed above, it is now time to sketch out 
the resulting model of growth and development. 
 
  The model we propose involves five key features: 
 
•  good government, with secure political conditions; 
•  credible macroeconomic stability; 
•  savings and investment high enough to sustain adequate growth; 
•  openness to the world economy, certainly in regard to trade, and desirably in regard 
to FDI inflows; 
•  the discipline of external engagement (e.g. belonging to WTO and an FTA). 
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  Although the above analysis already makes clear that meeting all these conditions is 
no easy task, there are enough success stories around the world to demonstrate that it can 
be done.  Moreover, the available success stories do not conform to any simple, standard 
blueprint, which shows us that many combinations of these features are capable of yielding 
sustained economic growth accompanied by improving living standards.  Nevertheless, there 
is some commonality, and I propose to argue in this section that it can usefully be discussed 
under the heading of ‘good governance and sound supportive institutions’.  In putting forward 
such a claim, naturally, I shall not be asserting that success stories have obviously ‘good’ 
governance and institutions; and that economic failures have the reverse.  Unfortunately, our 
world  is  not  that  straightforward.    Accordingly,  I  proceed  here  in  three  stages.    First,  I 
examine what we ought to mean by good governance and institutions; second, I explain the 
conditions under which governance and institutions turn out to be good enough to foster 
successful growth; last, I outline some implications of this discussion for economic policy. 
 
Good governance and institutions 
 
  While identifying and characterising the good is not so easy, we can certainly identify 
the  very  bad.    For  brevity,  let  me  simply  mention  Zimbabwe  (currently  experiencing  the 
highest  inflation  in  the  world,  and  with  output  and  employment  falling  rapidly)  and  North 
Korea  (still  a  hard-line  communist  regime,  with  living  standards  massively  lower  than  in 
South  Korea,  despite  a  similar  starting  point  around  1950  or  so);  Nigeria  (too  much  oil 
revenue stolen by the authorities), and Somalia (state collapse) are other examples.  These 
countries were deliberately chosen for their diversity, but despite that they do have some 
common characteristics that point the way to some useful lessons. 
 
  What are these characteristics?  I think two are really critical: (a) the failure to protect 
property rights; and (b) the lack of accountability of the state.  The second is much the more 
fundamental. 
  On property rights, Zimbabwe has expropriated thousands of white farmers without 
compensation in recent years (resulting in massive declines in farm output and exports), and 
the government has cleared numerous small traders and operators in the informal economy 
from major cities, ostensibly as part of a ‘clean up’ campaign.  When the courts have resisted 
these moves, judges have either been fired, or have fled abroad, fearing persecution.  The 
result is a situation in which few private businesses can feel secure in the property rights, 
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government recognises few private property rights except those of very small traders, some 
workers in arts and crafts, and private plots in agriculture.  Virtually all other private economic 
activity remains illegal.  In Nigeria, the legal framework is in place to protect property rights, 
but its effectiveness is undermined by a complex mix of corruption and patronage, not helped 
by  a  slow  and  very  inefficient  court  system.    Those  who  can  find  their  way  through  the 
‘system’ can prosper, but for others it must be more like a lottery.  An important observation 
here is that economic agents not only need their property rights protected from predation by 
the state, but they also need protection from other private agents; neither aspect is secure 
enough in Nigeria.  Last, Somalia has had no effective state in place for nearly two decades, 
and even when there has been some sort of central authority it has been unclear whether 
this would support any sort of sound property rights protection.  Hence there is little basis for 
private economic activity other than the limited forms that can survive through small, informal 
networks  (and  even  these  might  be  subject  to  ‘protection’  from  the  current  local 
warlord/bandit) and deals based on the property rights and courts of some other country (and 
even then, one imagines that business risks must be exceptionally severe, to put it mildly). 
  Accountability  is  a  more  complex  idea,  and  potentially  it  has  several  distinct 
dimensions  or  aspects.    To  understand  these,  it  is  simplest  to  proceed  by  asking  some 
simple questions: 
 
•  Can governments be changed, and if so, how often and through what mechanisms?  
Notice that this is not just a simple question about democracy in the sense of voting 
periodically for alternative political parties, since even if there is only one major party 
there  can still  be  some  competition for the top  leadership.    Also,  while  we  would 
naturally like elections to be free and fairly conducted according to the high standards 
of such bodies as the OSCE, I am not necessarily taking that for granted either. 
•  How easy is it for the government in power either to ignore the constitution or to 
change it to entrench the power of the current leadership (Zimbabwe has done both, 
with apparent impunity)?  This is a more complex question in those states, such as 
the UK, with no written constitution.  Then the question really asks how easy it would 
be for a government to change the prevailing understandings and conventions about 
the way government operates in the country. 
•  What  effective  constraints  are  in  place  to  prevent  a  ruling  group  from 
misappropriating  the  country’s  revenues  for  personal  gain,  and  hence  oblige  the 
group - at least to an acceptable extent - to fulfil its fiduciary responsibilities?  In Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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practice, this means having a central bank strong enough to withstand government 
pressure  (with  bank  governors  facing  no  risk  of  being  fired  or  worse!),  strong 
parliamentary oversight of the government’s finances (or equivalent), and a supreme 
court also capable of resisting government pressures (again, with judges safe from 
government persecution).  In recent years, none of this holds in Zimbabwe, little in 
Nigeria (explaining the country’s huge illegal diversion of oil revenues). 
•  What  role  is  played  by  the  parliament  (or  some  equivalent  body)  in  preparing, 
debating and passing legislation (as compared, for instance, to rule by decree)? 
•  To what extent, if at all, are bodies outside government and the legislature consulted 
over proposed legislation, and how far do their views ‘count’?  For instance, if there 
are to be changes in the laws governing private-sector business, might an association 
of business lawyers be consulted, or chambers of commerce? 
•  What role is played by the parliament in reviewing and reporting on various aspects of 
government  policy?    If  the  parliament  reports  very  critically,  can  the  government 
ignore the report with impunity? 
•  If citizens or firms consider that the government has acted illegally in some matter, 
will the courts hear their case, and if the court finds against the government, will the 
government take any notice?  (e.g. might a minister resign or be fired?  Or might 
policy be changed?) 
•  Are the media permitted to criticise the government and its policies, without fear of 
arrest or closure?  Related to this, are the media free to publicise the views of diverse 
political interest groups or parties, not merely those of the current ruling group? 
•  Are  citizens  themselves  -  either  individually  or  through  organisations  like  policy 
research centres or NGOs - free to criticise the government and its policies, without 
fear of arrest or other penalty (such as loss of their job)? 
 
  For the four countries taken as examples of bad practice, it is reasonably clear that 
not many of these points could be answered especially positively, with the possible exception 
of Nigeria in some respects.  Of the four, only Nigeria is currently enjoying some economic 
growth, and one suspects that is despite rather than because of the government’s economic 
policies  (except,  to  an  extent,  in  key  but  basic  areas  like  maintaining  macroeconomic 
stability). 
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Good enough governance and institutions 
 
  Within the Eurasian region, it is worth quoting from some recent IMF Country Reports 
(my italics): 
 
  The authorities saw spurring investment spending as key to boosting growth. 
Staff concurred but also noted that the really binding growth bottlenecks seemed to be 
insecure  property  rights,  corruption,  and  a  regulatory  jungle—structural  deficiencies 
that  were  also  reflected  in  underdeveloped  financial  markets.  (Report  on  Ukraine, 
February 2007). 
 
Structural reforms outside the banking sector remain very slow. The authorities agreed 
that structural reforms are behind schedule and claimed that high oil prices and robust 
growth  make  it  difficult  to  mobilize  political  support  for  reforms.  (Report  on  Russia, 
December 2006). 
 
Directors  urged  greater progress  in  addressing structural  obstacles to  job-intensive, 
inclusive  growth........More  broadly,  efforts  should  continue  to  improve  the  business 
climate and reform education, as well as to alleviate rural poverty through promoting 
agricultural growth. (Report on India, February 2007). 
 
  These comments all apply to countries that are currently growing quite rapidly, and as 
the  second  comment  states,  this  in  itself tends  to  discourage countries from  undertaking 
major economic reforms.  For reforms are frequently seen - at least by top political elites - as 
neither necessary, nor even desirable.  Yet many countries find it hard to introduce reforms 
in more difficult economic times, so these attitudes significantly impede the reform process.  
For these countries, and many others facing similar conditions, it is therefore interesting to 
consider what steps could be taken that might ‘unblock’ reforms, and hence how we might 
improve overall economic functioning. 
  Within the EU, there have long been concerns about the Union’s slow growth and 
lagging competitiveness, these concerns finding expression in the so called Lisbon Strategy 
agreed by the EU in March 2000.  At its launch, the Strategy was designed to encourage 
member states to boost European spending on R&D (with an eventual goal of spending 3% 
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labour  markets  more  flexible  and  to  improve  education  and  skills.    In  the  early  years, 
responses by the member states to this new challenge ranged from minimal to modest, so in 
2005 the whole process was reviewed and relaunched (see Commission, 2005). 
  According to Commission, 2005, pp.3-4 (my italics and emphasis): 
Today, we see that progress has at best been mixed. While many of the fundamental 
conditions are in place for a European renaissance, there has simply not been enough 
delivery at European and national level. This is not just a question of difficult economic 
conditions since Lisbon was launched, it also results from a policy agenda which has 
become overloaded, failing co-ordination and sometimes conflicting priorities. For some 
this suggests that we should abandon the ambition of 5 years ago. The Commission 
does not agree. The challenges we face are even more urgent in the face of an ageing 
population  and  global  competition.  Unless  we reinforce  our commitment  to meeting 
them, with a renewed drive and focus, our model for European society, our pensions, 
our quality of life will rapidly be called into question.  
 
The  need  for  urgent  action  is  confirmed  by  the  report  from  the  High  Level  Group 
chaired by Wim Kok last November. It identifies a daunting challenge. According to 
Kok, “The Lisbon strategy is even more urgent today as the growth gap with North 
America and Asia has widened, while Europe must meet the combined challenges of 
low population growth and ageing. Time is running out and there can be no room for 
complacency. Better implementation is needed to make up for lost time”. Faced with 
this challenge Europe needs to improve its productivity and employ more people.  
 
On current trends, the potential growth of the European economy will halve over the 
coming decades and reach just over 1% per year.  
 
  Across the EU, therefore, I would see the recent lack of reforms as a consequence of 
the complacency born of a different kind of economic success: not rapid growth as in the 
emerging economies, but rather the enjoyment of already high incomes and living standards 
(except for the new entrants, which might be expected to strive to catch up, as Ireland did, 
and Spain is doing). This complacency is evidently something we can live with for a while, 
but eventually Europe is likely to be overtaken economically by the more dynamic parts of 
the world, and perhaps then our leaders will take notice and address the challenges already 
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  Thus for the fast-growing countries of Eurasia, as well as for the already prosperous 
countries, the socio-political configuration needed to promote further economic reforms is not 
very favourable, in my view.  Nevertheless, in terms of the two main requirements for good 
governance that we identified above - protecting property rights and ensuring accountability 
of government - many of the conditions that we would like to see are already there.  But there 
are some worrying gaps, such as Russia’s politically coloured property-rights protection, and 
the  political  pressure  on  much  of  the  media  there;  the  poor  property  rights  protection  in 
Ukraine;  the  limited  opportunities  to  change  or  criticise  the  government  in  Kazakhstan 
(which, for the time being, matters less than it might, given the strong growth orientation of 
the government - in other words, it delivers results). Many similar examples could be given. 
  Good governance is also a matter for firms.  In that context it is usually interpreted to 
mean protection of shareholders’ rights, especially those of significant minority shareholders, 
but I think that is too narrow a conception.  Other relevant interest groups might also include 
the workforce, a firm’s customers, its bankers and other lenders, and the local community 
where its production takes place.  Thinking along these lines makes governance seem like a 
very complicated notion, involving some rather delicate juggling.  It becomes even more so if 
we choose to take on board modern notions of corporate social responsibility, with the idea 
that  firms  should  strive  to  uphold  high  environmental  standards  (promoting  their  ‘green’ 
image), high labour standards, and so on. However, given the focus of this paper on issues 
of growth and efficiency in modern economies, we would be as well here to emphasise the 
need for firms to be profitable, innovative, and inclined to invest in new products, services 
and markets.  Institutional arrangements that promote this will likely prove most effective both 
for firms’ own success, and for maximising their contribution to growth and development in 




What does the above tell us about the approach we should adopt when advising a country 
about its future economic policy?  At the risk of appearing simplistic, I shall simply list a few 
points that seem to me to merit careful consideration. 
 
•  Be modest.  By this I mean two things: first, we should not exaggerate what we know 
and  understand  about  the  requirements  for  growth  and  development;  second,  we 
should not rush in with recommendations just because something isn’t quite ‘as we Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
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do it in Western Europe and the US’.  If something is working tolerably well and an 
economy is growing quite satisfactorily, we should not rush in to ‘fix’ it.  Instead, we 
should be trying to understand why it works as it does, in case the country concerned 
might  itself  offer  lessons  for  others.    There  is  no  simple,  single  model,  either  of 
economic systems or economic policy. 
 
•  If there is an identified problem that we seek to address (e.g. lack of a functioning 
system for settling business disputes), then where possible we should give advice 
that  builds  on  practices,  institutions  and  organisations  that  already  exist,  and  are 
familiar  in  the  country  concerned.    That  is  more  likely  to  be  successful  than  an 
approach that seeks to transplant a ‘ready-made solution’ from another country. 
 
•  Beware  of  the  ‘scattergun’  approach  to  policy  advice.    This  is  the  approach  that, 
essentially,  advises  a  country  to  undertake  reforms  in  practically  every  area  of 
economic policy, usually trying to make the country’s economic arrangements look 
quite like those of the US or UK, or some other supposedly ‘model economy’.  While if 
we recommend enough things, there is a good chance that some of them will be valid 
and sensible, the approach is intellectually lazy.  Moreover, if taken seriously by the 
recipient  country,  especially  if  the  latter  is  small  and  poor,  then  its  public 
administration is likely to be seriously overloaded by the resulting tasks.  This surely 
cannot  serve  the  presumed  end  of  boosting  the  country’s  economic  performance.  
Better to focus on two or three key recommendations, I would argue, though at times 
this runs up against the incentives often faced by policy advisers (in the sense that 
they - or their line managers - might not feel they are providing ‘value for money’ if 
they advise a country to do so little). 
 
  Finally, in providing such advice, I strongly concur with the view of Rodrik (2004), who 
argues  that  we  should  identify  the  key  constraints  (institutional,  policy,  or  whatever)  that 
appear to be blocking growth in a given country, and focus our policy advice on these areas.  
This, of course, is a difficult message to implement, since it demands very careful analysis of 
the country concerned, not merely at the level of its laws and official policies, but at the far 
deeper  level  of  the  institutions  and  practices  that  influence  their  implementation  and 
effectiveness. 
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VI. Conclusions on Governance 
 
  Our story is already too long, but let me conclude by trying to sum up where we have 
reached.  First, we have sketched a model of what we may term the political economy of 
growth that we summed up in five points, repeated here for reference: 
 
Model: Political Economy of Growth 
 
•  good government, with secure political conditions; 
•  credible macroeconomic stability; 
•  savings and investment high enough to sustain adequate growth; 
•  openness to the world economy, certainly in regard to trade, and desirably in regard 
to FDI inflows; 
•  the discipline of external engagement (e.g. belonging to WTO and an FTA). 
 
  We then argued that such a model needed to be underpinned by suitable governance 
arrangements, both at the level of government and at the level of firms.  Focussing on the 
former,  we  suggested  that  good  governance  could  be  thought  of  as  a  mix  of  two  main 




•  protection of property rights 
•  accountability of government. 
 
  For countries not yet prosperous and not yet growing very much, their most urgent 
need must be to improve governance arrangements in ways that make government promises 
to respect and protect private property rights credible enough to stimulate the entry of new 
firms into the market, and to encourage growth in private investment.  This is very much what 
happened in China, for example.  No one would claim, I believe, that China’s governance 
arrangements conform to any supposed ‘ideal’ model, but they are amazingly better than the 
near anarchy that prevailed during the terrible years of the Cultural Revolution (mid-1960s to 
mid-1970s).  Moreover, hard lessons learned then convinced China’s leaders that they would 
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and this has helped to make their economic promises credible.  Formally, a good deal of 
China’s economic arrangements is still not governed by clear, legally enforceable property 
rights in the Western sense, but they work because people believe in them.  Running an 
economy  is  like  a  repeated game,  in the  sense  that  once  promises  are  made  and kept, 
economic  agents  increasingly  believe  that  they  will  continue  to  be  kept.    This  facilitates 
further growth. 
  In contrast, Nigeria’s leaders have stolen oil money for decades and are expected go 
on doing so, with the result that few people expect rapid improvements in publicly provided 
services like education and health care, or in basic infrastructure.  Some growth is possible 
under these conditions, but not much, and most ordinary people remain shockingly poor.  
When  government  promises  are  repeatedly  broken,  most  sensible  people  expect  that  to 
continue and hence adapt themselves as best they can to that situation. 
  Across Eurasia, with very few exceptions, most countries are not among the poorest 
in  the  world,  and  as  we  saw  above,  most  belong  to  one  of  two  groups:  (a)  the  already 
prosperous countries of the European Union; and (b) the rapidly growing but poorer countries 
of the CIS, China, India, and a few others.  For both groups of countries, we saw that despite 
shortcomings, property rights protection was sufficiently in place to foster growth where it 
was needed, and accountability conditions are either good, or recently improved.  We saw 
that for different reasons, both groups of countries might now be quite disinclined to rush 
through further economic reforms, except as and when they identified pressing economic or 
social problems that needed attention. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 337 -  The Political Economy of Growth and Governance 
 
 




                                                 
1. The frequency of military coups, spells of military dictatorship, and, indeed, civil wars around world 
shows that this is not a condition to be taken for granted anywhere.  But an extensive investigation of 
this aspect of the ‘rule of law’ is beyond the scope of this paper. 
2.  A little outside the scope of this paper, but nevertheless developing a really interesting idea about 
property rights and the oligarchy in Russia, is the recent paper, Braguinsky and Myerson (2007). 
3. See, for instance,  Sachs and Warner, 2001; also  Mehlum et al., 2006, for an extension  of the 
analysis to illustrate the role of institutions in influencing the outcomes in particular countries. 
4. The acquis communautaire is the full set of rules, regulations and legislation governing the EU, and 
it is often estimated to run to many tens of thousands of pages.  The process of monitoring each 
country’s progress in implementing the acquis can be studied by reviewing the Commission’s annual 
monitoring reports, some of which were extremely critical on certain topics.  See the relevant part of 
the EU website: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm  
5.  These three conditions together: implementing the acquis; operating as stable democracies; and 
being able to withstand economic competition from existing member states, are often referred to as 
the Copenhagen criteria for accession.  They were first adopted at the June 1993 European Council 
meeting that took place in Copenhagen. 
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